Constitutional Ambiguity and Federal Authority
Somalia’s Provisional Constitution enshrines a federal system that relies on clearly defined powers and respect for state-level autonomy. Articles 48 and 54 leave little room for interpretation any authority not explicitly delegated to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) resides with the Federal Member States (FMS). Identity registration, notably, is not listed among the federal government’s exclusive competencies. Instead, it falls under civil registration, citizenship verification, and local administration—areas traditionally regarded as shared or residual responsibilities.
Against this legal backdrop, the unilateral creation of the National Identity and Registration Authority (NIRA) has sparked a nationwide debate. Legal scholars, policymakers, and FMS authorities contend that the FGS may be exceeding its constitutional mandate, encroaching on the rights and prerogatives of the states. This is not merely an administrative question; it is a test of constitutional discipline, federal balance, and the long-term credibility of Somalia’s state-building process. Indeed, it is precisely this potential overreach that raises concerns about the process by which NIRA was introduced.
Limited Consultation with Federal Member States
If the constitutional ambiguity raised initial alarms, the approach to NIRA’s rollout has only intensified them. Article 50 of the Provisional Constitution emphasizes cooperation and consultation as fundamental pillars of federal governance. Yet, NIRA’s implementation has been widely perceived as a top-down initiative that largely bypassed these requirements. Federal Member States report they were not afforded meaningful input into the design, governance, or operational framework of a national identity system—an instrument that directly affects their security responsibilities, service delivery mechanisms, and civic documentation processes. This lack of consultation has deepened political mistrust and hardened positions. In a country where intergovernmental trust is fragile, sidelining the FMS risks transforming a potentially valuable reform into a source of friction. Without broad consensus, NIRA could evolve into yet another centralized structure in a system explicitly designed to prevent the concentration of power.
Concerns Regarding Legislative and Procedural Legitimacy
Article 50 of the Provisional Constitution is explicit in requiring collaboration, consultation, and power-sharing across levels of government. Federal institutions affecting state-level functions are expected to be designed through inclusive processes that ensure nationwide ownership. However, several Federal Member States contend that they were not adequately consulted during NIRA’s conception, design, or rollout.
This perceived lack of meaningful engagement has contributed to skepticism regarding NIRA’s legitimacy. In addition, questions have been raised about whether the legislative procedures used to establish NIRA complied with the constitutional requirement for bicameral approval—especially the role of the Upper House, which exists specifically to safeguard the interests of Federal Member States. Ambiguities in the legislative process further deepen concerns about the institution’s legal soundness.
The establishment of the National Identification and Registration Authority (NIRA) in Somalia raises substantial legal, constitutional, and administrative concerns, particularly in light of the existence of fully operational identification mechanisms at both the federal and state levels. Somalia presently maintains a valid, internationally recognized biometric passport, which functions as the principal instrument of national identification, incorporating biographic data, biometric identifiers, security elements, and nationality verification, and thus conforms to global standards of personal identification.
The presence of such a passport system calls into question the necessity and legality of instituting an additional federal identification framework, especially given that Articles 48 and 54 of the Provisional Constitution reserve to the Federal Member States powers not expressly conferred upon the Federal Government. Furthermore, each Federal Member State has independently invested in civil registration and identification systems, which citizens utilize for local services, intra-state mobility, security clearance, employment verification, and, in jurisdictions conducting local elections, electoral registration.
These state-level systems constitute the operational and functional backbone of population management and enjoy both accessibility and community trust. The unilateral creation of a federal ID by NIRA risks duplicating these existing systems, undermining the authority of state civil registries, generating administrative redundancies, imposing unnecessary financial burdens, and creating citizen confusion. The introduction of a third, separate federal identification system, alongside the existing passport and state-issued IDs, would produce three layers of identification, leading to
• Conflicting databases
• Inconsistent verification standards
• Wasted resources
• Administrative overlap
• Citizen frustration and uncertainty
Such fragmentation not only compromises efficiency but also threatens the integrity of civil registration and population management. Identity systems inherently involve sensitive personal and biometric data that determine eligibility for services, humanitarian aid, taxation, security clearance, mobility, and electoral participation.
In Somalia’s fragile political environment, where trust between governmental institutions is limited, centralization of such authority at the federal level engenders concerns regarding data security, neutrality, and potential misuse. Federal Member States and civil society actors have expressed apprehension that, absent robust safeguards, the system could be politicized or wielded in a manner disproportionately affecting certain regions or communities.
NIRA’s current approach, widely perceived as an attempt to supplant rather than integrate state-level civil registration systems, contravenes recognized international federal best practices, which emphasize cooperative, decentralized, or hybrid models that align national identification frameworks with subnational institutions.
To address the concerns surrounding NIRA and to ensure constitutional conformity, Somalia could benefit from a coordinated, constitutionally grounded approach that prioritizes federal–state cooperation, legal compliance, and citizen trust, ensuring that identity management systems are harmonized, secure, and reflective of Somalia’s federal structure while preserving the integrity and authority of existing state-level civil registration mechanisms.
A structured federal–state dialogue delineating roles and responsibilities
A legislative review to ensure NIRA’s alignment with constitutional mandates
Integration of existing passports and state IDs into a harmonized system rather than their replacement
Enactment of clear data protection and privacy laws to foster citizen trust
A phased, consultative approach to identity modernization.
Implementation of these measures would ensure that identity management respects the federal structure, safeguards civil registration integrity, mitigates institutional overreach, and enhances national confidence in Somalia’s identification system.
Conclusion
While the objective of establishing a national identity authority is commendable, NIRA’s current framework faces constitutional ambiguity, procedural challenges, and fundamental questions about necessity. Somalia already possesses a valid national passport and functioning state-level identification systems. Introducing an entirely new federal ID system—without harmonization or constitutional clarity—risks duplication, political tension, and inefficiency. A successful identity system for Somalia must be grounded in federal cooperation, legal certainty, and respect for existing institutions. Through consultation and consensus-building, Somalia can modernize identification in a manner that strengthens—rather than disrupts—its evolving federal governance structure.
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By Abdifatah Abdinur
State Minister of the Presidency
Puntland State of Somalia