By:-Muna Kamila.
July 25/07/2025.
Bossaso, 24 July 2025 — The Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) successfully
apprehended the MV Sea World, a Comoros-flagged cargo vessel, on 18 July 2025 near Bareeda in Puntland’s territorial waters.
The vessel was anchored without proper
authorization, lacking any customs clearance or diplomatic documentation, in clear
violation of both Somali law and international maritime regulations.
Upon inspection, authorities discovered the ship was carrying a large cache of military-
grade weapons and armored vehicles.
Puntland officials confirmed that the shipment
included no commercial goods and was transported without any customs papers,government approval, or notification to the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee—breaching multiple international arms control protocols.
The vessel had previously made stops in Dongguan, China, and Port Sudan. The unexplained Port Sudan
docking has raised concerns over the true origin and intent of the shipment.
Puntland acted lawfully by intercepting these weapons, effectively preventing them from
reaching unauthorized groups such as Al-Shabaab and ISIS. This decisive intervention plays a crucial role in preserving peace and stability in East Africa and beyond. Rather than opposing Puntland’s efforts, the Federal Government should acknowledge and commend its commitment to preventing illicit arms transfers.
Legal Governance and Violations Within the Region This interception highlights several legal breaches under Somali and international law.
Under the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1425 (2002), 2093 (2013), and
2662 (2022), any arms shipments destined for Somalia must be pre-notified to the UN
Sanctions Committee five days prior to arrival, including full end-user verification.
Additionally, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal states have the right to board vessels in their territorial waters if national security is at risk. Puntland invoked this right under Articles 25 and 27 to legally detain the MV Sea.
According to Somalia’s Provisional Constitution (Article 54), the Federal Government alone has the authority to approve arms imports. No such approval or notification has been presented for this shipment.
Conflicting Claims and Lack of Documentation
Following the interception, ownership claims have emerged from several parties: Somali traders based in Mogadishu, the Somali Federal Government, and the Turkish Ambassador to Somalia, who alluded to the possibility that the shipment was linked to Turkish military aid or training programs. Notably, each of these actors—private Somali businessmen,
federal authorities, and the Turkish diplomatic mission—has independently asserted a claim over the cargo. This convergence of divergent and overlapping assertions raises a
critical and unsettling question:
Who is the rightful owner of the shipment?
The inconsistencies and lack of transparency in these claims have deepened suspicions
regarding the nature and intended destination of the weapons and have raised serious
concerns about the potential involvement of official or semi-official entities in unauthorized or covert arms transfers.
However, Puntland officials emphasize that none of these parties have produced the
legally required customs documentation, end-user certificates, or notifications to the
UN, raising serious doubts about the legitimacy of the shipment.
Suspected Illicit Networks Investigations have identified AbdiNasir Ali Mahamud, known as “Ina Adoon,” as a potential financier of the shipment. Mahamud was blacklisted by the U.S. Treasury in 2021 for trafficking weapons to the Houthis in Yemen and coordinating with Iran’s Quds Force.
He reportedly operates shell companies in Turkey, the UAE, and Djibouti, which may have
facilitated the shipment’s financing.
There are also unverified reports suggesting involvement of individuals close to Somali
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in smuggling activities, although no official confirmation is available.
Calls for Transparency and International Oversight
The Puntland administration urges the Somali Federal Government and Turkish authorities
to comply fully with international law by providing:
- Pre-notification to the UN Sanctions Committee
- Valid customs and import documentation
- Bills of lading
- Ministry of Defense authorization and end-user certificates.
Without such documentation, the shipment constitutes a violation of Somali law,
international arms embargoes, and UN resolutions.
Furthermore, the Turkish Ambassador’s assertion raises legal concerns, as diplomatic representatives do not possess the authority to authorize or assert claims concerning military cargo shipments under international law, diplomatic norms, or arms control
agreements.
- Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) – Article 41 This international treaty governs the conduct and privileges of diplomatic agents
worldwide.
According to Article 41(1):
“It is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws
and regulations of the receiving State. They also have a duty not to interfere in the internal
affairs of that State.”
Implication:
A diplomat may communicate official positions or requests on behalf of their
sending state, but they may not interfere in military, customs, or internalregulatory matters—such as directly claiming or validating weapons shipments.
If the cargo was genuinely intended for TurkSom or Turkish military advisors, the Turkish Ministry of National Defense—not the ambassador—should have notified the UN and Somali authorities through formal channels.
Conclusion
The seizure of the MV Sea World underscores ongoing challenges in combating illicit arms
trafficking into Somalia. In response, Puntland calls on the United Nations Security Council and international partners to launch an independent investigation into the shipment’s origin, ownership, and intended recipients.
Ensuring transparency and strict adherence to international arms control protocols is vital to safeguarding regional stability and preventing the diversion of weapons to unauthorized
actors or terrorist organizations.
From a legal perspective, the absence of customs clearance, UN notification, and a proper
chain of custody strongly suggests a violation of international arms transfer regulations.
Should federal or Turkish authorities claim legitimate ownership, they must demonstrate
full compliance with UN-mandated procedures. Failure to do so would raise serious
concerns about potential complicity in unauthorized arms transfers. Moreover, reported connections to sanctioned trafficking networks further emphasize the urgent need for an impartial, UN-led investigation.